232 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 



Neither is this dodrine entirely antient ; but it is fupported likewifc 

 by modern authority. The firft 1 Ihali alledge, is that of a philofopher 



of 



more parts, that is, fpecicfes of it. cvh yx^ r«s-« Y«;^;«^t;r«f, «xa« Tf^eg<e» tfuTuj, .if, 

 i KKi -mtku^,. And, indeed, if we hold that the motive principle in unorganized bodies 

 is immaterial, as well as that in organized bodies, which 1 think every man muft do 

 who believes in God, I would defire to know, by what other name we are to call that 

 which is immaterial, if not by the name of m;Wj for all things exifting are either maN 

 ter or mind? Now, that Ariftotle was a Theift, no body can doubt, who has ftudied 

 his works with any attention ; and, particularly, that he believed nature to be a prin- 

 ciple of movement quite different from the matter which it moves, is evident from the 

 whole fyftcm of his natural philofophy; fo that it is unnccefTary to prove it by particular 

 paflages ; 1 fliall, therefore, only quote one, which happens to be at prefent before me. 

 It is in the fiift chapter of his incomparable work, De Partibus Aniynalium, p. 970. 

 (edit. Du Val,) Avhere, fpeaking of thofe natural philofophers that fpeak only of the 

 matter of natural things, he fays, that thofe philofophers know not what ;2c/Mr<f is ; 

 for fays he, nature is more a principle than matter. ct^z*i 7«? »i ?'■'«"'« /^«>^^4» -rm ixr^i. 



It is further to be obferved, that Ariftotle not only diftinguiflies the motive principle 

 in organized bodies, from that in vegetables and animals, but all the three from intel- 

 leEl • which, from feveral paflages I have quoted above, he makes to be a principle 

 very different from what he calls nature; making the difference to confifl chiefly in 

 this that intclled a6ls not only for a certain end and purpofe, but with knowledge of 

 that end and with intention : Whereas nature adls, indeed, for an end, and moft ar- 

 tificially, in order to attain that end, but blindly, and without knowledge or intention. 

 But becaufe he makes this difference betwixt intelletfl and the mind of the animal or 

 Tegetable, docs he therefore deny that intclled is mind? On the contrary, through the 

 whole of his books ^m 4--';^'!f> he fpeaks of the intellect as a fpecies of mind^ but much 

 higher and nobler than any of the other two ; tutn^** t. yi^a ■^v^'n. 



The truth, therefore, appears to be, that all the four kinds belong to the general 

 idea of mind, but dlflerent very much one from another, in dignity and excellence. 

 And that he thought the principle, in organized or elemental bodies, internal, as 

 well as the other principles, is evident from his whole Phyfics, particularly the firft 

 chapter of the 2d book, where he makes the diflinflion betwixt the works of art and 

 the things of nature, to be, that the latter have a principle of movement in themfelves j 



whereas 



