286 A N T I N E T METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 



an event as may be, or may not be produced by any caufe. But the phllo- 

 fophcr knows that every thing le not only produced by fome caufe, but 

 by a fixed and determinate caufe, that is, by a caufe which has a natural 

 tendency to produce that effed, and which operates regularly for that 

 purpofe. But thefe caufes we very often do not know ; and therefore 

 we fpeak of the events produced by them as uncertain, and fay, that 

 they happen by accident. 



In this way wc applythe word accident^ when we fay, that, * By ac- 

 ' cident, it was a bad day yefterday, but ic may happen to be a good 

 * day to-inorrovv.' i his is ipeakiug unphilofophically and i;nproper- 

 ly: bccauie all fuch exents are produced by c:ules as certain and deter- 

 minate as any other thing in nature, though we do not kiiow them, at 

 lean, cannot com bine them, and calculate their efFeds ; for we know, 

 in geupral, that the changes of the weather are produced by certain 

 changes in our atmofphcre j and we know farther, that the changes 

 in the atmofphere are produced by feveral different caufes, all opera- 

 ting regularly and uniformly ; wl ch caufes though we may be 

 able to enumerate, yet we cannot explain how, and m what degree, 

 each of them opejates. For the fame reafon, it is a common impro- 

 priety of fptech, that the caft of a dve, or a good or bad hand at 

 cards, is a matter of chance ; becaufe thefe events depend upon caufes 

 as certain as the weather, at,d known to us pretty much in the fame 

 Wciy ; for we know, in general, that it is the motion given to the dye, 

 when it is fli ken and thrown out of tl e box. that produces the calf, 

 as it is the fhuffling and cutiir g the c.rds ti.at makes the hand fuch as 

 it is. But, though we kr)ow that thife are the caules ot thoie events, 

 yet we cannot tell how they opeiate, or by what fleps and progrefs 

 of intermediate caufes they produce thefe efFeds. 



It is n-^t, therefore, our ignorance of caufes that makes chance; for 

 we often difpute about the caufes of things that are moft certain in 



their 



