Chap. XX. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I G S. 287 



their event, and happen every day. Thus, the rlfing and fettlng of 

 the Tun fome afcrlbe to material caufes ; others to miml^ as I do ; and 

 fome divide the matter betwixt mind and material neceffity, Bclides, 

 \^ chance depended merely upon our apprehenfions of things, and the 

 greater or leis extent or certainty of our knowledge, it would have no 

 foundation in nature ; and, therefore, to treat of it, would not belong 

 either to the natural philofopher, or the metaphyfician, but to thofe 

 arts whofe fubjeds are the opinions of men. 



And here the matter appears to be more involved than ever, and the 

 reader may fay, that, inftead of clearing it up, I have only puzzled 

 and perplexed it ; for, if what happens commonly is not chance — if 

 neither, what happens rarely, is not always chance — if what is pro- 

 duced by fixed and determinate caufes, is likewife not chance — and, if 

 every thing in nature is fo produced — and, if even our ignorance of 

 thofe caufes will not make the event fortuitous — What then \?> fortune 

 or chance ? It appears to be nothing but a name ; and this great 

 Goddefs, whom all the world adores, and to whom fo many temples 

 and altars have been reared, is nothing but a mere phantom of the 

 imagination. 



And it would be fo, if nature and man never produced any thing 

 but what they intended ; for we are to remember, that mind, accord- 

 ing to my fyftem, produces every thing in the world, either a6ling 

 without choice or deliberation, and without intelligence, which is what 

 I call Nature, or, with choice, deliberation, and intelligence, which is 

 what 1 call Ma7i. 



And here begins to appear the folution of the difficulty ; for, It is 

 evident, that many things happen, befidcs what man intends or pro- 

 pofes ; and, alfo, fome things happen different from what we know 

 is aimed at by Nature. 



Now, 



