Chap. XXI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 297 



human adions. Bur, when I had acquh'ed more knowledge in that 

 phllofophy, and found that they had diftingulfhed accurately betwixt 

 Jenje and intelleH^ fenfations and ideas ^ injlincl and opinion^ appetite and 

 iJuilU I fco" difcovered the reafon why there was no difpute among 

 them, upon a queftion about which fo many volumes have been writ- 

 ten in modern times, and to fo little purpofc ; for, I maintain, that, if 

 the things I juft now mentioned are well defined, and carefully diftin- 

 guiflied one from another, there can be no difpute upon the fubjed:, 

 not even among the vulgar, far lefs among philofophers. And, how- 

 ever paradoxical, at firft fight, it may feem, I defpair not to make it 

 evident to common apprehenfion, that all luiU is free-ivill ', and that, 

 at the fame time, it is necejfary, but of a necejjtty very different from 

 material or phyfical neceflity. 



I do not, however, pretend to make this dodrine intelligible to thofe 

 who have not learned to diftinguifli two faculties of the mind fo dif- 

 ferent 2i%fmje and intellect^ and who confequently ojQViioviW^fenJations 

 and ideas^ making no difference betwixt them, but what a late philo- 

 ibpher has thought proper to make, viz. that the former \s s. Jlronget^ 

 the latter a iveaker imprejfton upon the mind ; fo that they differ only 

 in degree, not in kind. This philofophy, if it may be called fuch, 

 not only takes away all diftindion betwixt the fenfitive and intellec- 

 tual part of our nature, and has many other bad confequences, of 

 which I have taken notice elfewhere ; but it puts an end to 2\\ fcience 

 of the human mind ; for, where there is no diftindion of kind, but 

 only degrees of quality of things of the fame kind, of which it is im- 

 poffible there can be any certain meafure or ftandard, there no fcience 



can be *. 



P p This 



* The reafon why quantity^ whether continuous or difcrete, though it be but an 

 accident or property of fubftance, is a fubje£l of fcience, is, that each kind of it fur- 

 nifhes a ftandard or meafure for itfelf. Thus extcnfiQUf which is quantity continuous, 



can 



