300 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 



fhall follow this or that impulfe of appetite, not concerning what is 

 good or ill. 



The brute, therefore, as he has no ivill^ muft ad neceflarily ; for 

 there is no medium betwixt thefe two. But it is a necejjtty of a differ- 

 ent kind from what I call material necejfity ; for his movements are 

 fpontaneous, proceeding from appetite and defire, which Is not to be 

 found in unorganized matter, nor even in the vegetable, which, there- 

 fore, has no fpontaniety. But, as thcfe appetites and defires do not 

 arife from any opinions that he has formed, like our defires, and 

 therefore are not from himfelf, but are given him by Superior Wif- 

 dom for the prefervation of the individual and continuation of the 

 kind, and are fuch that he muft necefTarlly be led by them, his ac- 

 tions, therefore, are alfo neceffary ; but it is a neceffity which ought 

 not to be called material necejfity^ but rather divine necejfity ; the na- 

 ture of which, I fhall, in the fequel, explain. 



But, though the movements of the brute be neceffary, we are not 

 from thence to conclude, as the Cartefians do, that the brute is a mere 

 machine ; for a machine is that which has Its moving principle from 

 without ; whereas the moving principle of the brute is internal, and a 

 part of himfelf, though, in its movements, it be direded by an Intelli- 

 gence not belonging to him. 



From this account of ijoilU and the adions which refult from It, com- 

 pared with the operations of the brute, the vegetable and unorganized 

 matter, it Is evident that there can be no w/// but where there are 

 ideas, and a comparifon of thofe ideas ; from which comparlfon there 

 arlfes the propofition, that fuch a thing is good, or fuch a thing is ill; 

 therefore it ought to be done or not done ; And, whatever animal 

 cannot reafon and form propofitions of that kind, has not 'ujill But 

 the moving principle muft be either thofe appetites or defires of the 



brute 



