304 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IT. 



it is not the uncertainty of the caufe, but that it is the concourfe of 

 two caufes, both operating neceflarily, which makes chance. If, by 

 chance^ is meant what I beHeve is the vulgar fenfe of the word, an e- 

 vent which may or may not be produced by any caufe, my anfwer is, 

 that there is no fuch thing in Nature as chance in this fenie of the 

 word, every thing being neceffarily produced by fome determinate 

 caufe, and nothing being a caufe which does not produce its effect. 

 Even the Materiahfts of old, fuch as Epicurus, did not fay that any 

 thing was produced by chance of this kind, (though I know it is com- 

 monly underftood otherwife,) but by material neceffity ; and, indeed, 

 to maintain that any thing is produced by fuch chance, is to give up 

 the whole fyflem of nature, and puts an end, at once, to all philofophy 

 upon the fubje(Sl. 



And this neceiTity of if///, I apprehend to befo much ftrongerthan 

 material neceffity, that the latter may, by the ad of the f eity, be fuf- 

 pended, at leaf!:, for a time. A flone, for example, may be fufpended ia 

 the air, without that ftone being annihilated, or even the motion of 

 the celeftial bodies we might conceive ftopt for a while, and yet thofe 

 bodies flill continue to exill *. But we could not conceive this men- 

 tal 



* Sucli things are commonly called m'lradeiy and are much ridiculed by our free- 

 thinkers, who fay that they are, by NaturCy impolTible, and cannot be believed to 

 happen, except by ignorance and fuperftition. But, if Nature be what I have 

 defined it, viz. mind without intelligence acting in body, or upon body, there is no 

 abfurdity in fuppofing that this mind (hould not only a£l in its ordinary and regular 

 courfe, but fometimes in an extraordinary manner, under the controul and direction 

 of intelligence, lupreme or fubordinate. We every day experience, that, by our 

 fmall fhare of intelligence and animal force, we arc able to controul the powers 

 of Nature in fome degree ; and it is juft as eafy to conceive how the fame thing may 

 be done, in a much greater degree, by a greater power or intelligence. If man can 

 fufpcnd in the air a weight of i oo tons, Why may not an angel fufpend one of 

 100,000 ? If we can flop or divert the courfe of great rivers here upon earth. Why 



may 



