3o8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I L 



One llirnid have thought, that the author might have been fatisfied 

 with the glory of maintaining a paradox fo contrary to the common 

 fe-.le and feelings of mankind; but he defired to be as impious and 

 blalphemous as he is paradoxical ; and, therefore, the conclufion of 

 his argument is, That, as there is a continued chain of neceflary 

 caufes pre-ordained and pre-determined, influencing the volitions of 

 men^ in the fame manner as the operations of matter \ and, as this 

 chain of caufes reaches from the Original Caufe of all, that caufe 

 muft be mediately the Author of all moral evil, as well as natural; 

 confequently cannot be that Good and Beneficent Being, which we 

 fuppofe him to be, but a Being of a very different kind, wicked 

 and malignant, being ultimately the author of guilt and moral turpi- 

 tude in all his creatures, and, by confequence, the caufe of all their mi- 



fery *. 



What 



• This author is lefs fceprical in a conclufion of fuch daring impiety, than he ufu- 

 ally is in his conclufions. That 1 may not appear to have mifreprefented his mean- 

 ing, I will give his words, taken from the London edition of his works, publiflied in 

 four volumes, under the title of ' Eflays and Treatifes on Several bubjecls, by David 



* Hume, Efquire.' In the third volume is contained his treatife upon liberty and nc- 

 cejfity; where, after having laid it down, that the liberty of human a£lions, and their 

 merit and demerit, is founded upon nothing elfe but their proceeding from the inter- 

 nal difpofitions of the mind, and having alfo laid it down, that the difpofitions and vo- 

 litions of the human mind are determined in the fame manner as the operations of 

 matter, by a C07it'inued chain of necejfary caufes^ reaching from the Original Caufe of ally 

 to every fingle volition of every fingle creature^ (p. 141.) he flates this alternative, 

 ' Either that, if human a£lions can be traced up, by a necefTary chain, to the Deity, 



* they can never be criminal, on account of the infinite perfe^lion of that Being, 



* from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether 



* good and laudable : Or, if they be criminal, we mud retract the attribute of perfec- 



* tion which we afcribe to the Deity, and muft acknowledge him to be the ultimate 



* author of guilt and moral turpitude, in all his creatures ;' p. 142. Then, having 

 rejetled the firft alternative, and having fhown that human actions are criminal, the 

 fecond alternative, according to his method of reafoning, is unavoidable. And, accord- 

 ingly, he conclujcs his argument in thefc words : * The fecond obje£lion, (viz. 



* that the Deity is ultimately the author oi guilt and moral turpitude in all his crea- 



* tureSj) 



