^i8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book HI. 



the ^enus is an'wial. So that 7nan is an <3wi;;/^/ rational, and capable of 

 intelleci and/nVwr^. But, by that definition, it is impoffible I can know 

 what man is, unlefs 1 know what animal is ; and that, again, I can know- 

 no otherwile than by definition ; 1 inuft therefore iikewife define ani' 

 mat : Nor can 1 do that, without difcovering the genus of anhnaU as, 

 before, 1 dilcovered the genus of man. 1 hat genus I accordingly find 

 out to be the to \^'4vx.'iv, or animated Jiibjiance. But, how far am I to 

 eo on in this way ? if I am to go on to infinity, and there be no 

 flop, it is evident there can be no compleat definition, nor, confe- 

 quently, any fcience ; for there is no fcience of infinites. There muft 

 therefore be, of neceffity, fome higheft genus, beyond which we can- 

 not go. And this highell genus is what I call the {ird formal caufe 

 of the thing, being that univerfal form which comprehends the parti- 

 cular form of the thing defined, as well as of many other things *. 



The queftion, then, is, What i\ic{e forms are, and how many ? for, 

 if they could not be reduced to number, there could be no fcience of 

 them ; and the principles of things would, in fo far, be infinite and 

 incomprehenfible. But, in the Pythagorean fchool, or, rather, I be- 

 lieve 



* See Origin of Language, Vol. I. page 72. and page 520. where this rife of ideas 

 or generals, above one another, till we come to thofe univerfals, is explained. I will 

 only add here, that the definition of any thing is, in the language of Arillotle, called 

 the ii^o;, the ro t« '«> 'uvxi, or, fimply, the ra nveny or, laftly, the ^#y«s rvn ova-ica, all 

 ■which denote the fame thing, viz. the idea ox form of the thing, which is what is com- 

 prehended in the definition. For the matter, though we may confider it in conjunc- 

 tion with the form, (as Arillotle fays we ought to confider all natural fubftances,) is 

 never part of the delinition, being, by its nature, indefinable. There is, therefore, a 

 diflin^tion betwixt the cva-ix, or thing actually exifling, that is, the matter and form 

 conjoined, and the P^ayoj t»;; oy7/«j, that is, the ybrw fimply, as comprehended in the 

 definition. Thus, there is a difference betwixt a^d^uTrei, that is, the compound, and 

 TO itvxi xvi^aTrmy that is, the form fimply; a manner of fpe iking, not intelligible, ex- 

 cept to thofe who know the diftinclion betwixt matter and fonn ; and that, in the o- 

 pinion of Arillotle, and, indeed, all the antlcnt philofophers, it is the /orw which 

 gives being 10 the thing, and makes it what it is. 



