Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 323 



tian, and a BIfhop, fuch as Dr Berkley, the Intention of whofe writing 

 was to confute the Atheifts, and to eftabUfh the belief of immaterial 

 fubftances upon the moft folid grounds, fhould maintain the fame doc- 

 trine, can be afcribed to nothing elfe but to abfolute ignorance of the 

 philofophy of both Plato and Ariftotle ; for, tho' Arillotle would not 

 admit that thofe ideas had a feparate exiftence, not only out of any cor- 

 poreal fubftance, but out of the mind of any intelligent being, which 

 he fays his mafter Plato maintained ; yet, neither he, nor any of the 

 philofophers of his fchool, had the leaft doubt but that they exifted in 

 the mind. 



With men who, out of mere vanity, maintain the moft extravagant 

 paradoxes, without regard of what the confequences may be to religion 

 and morality, provided they acquire the reputation of great abilities 

 and fuperior parts, it would be vain to argue ; but, to thofe who believe 

 in God, and think there is fuch a thing asfcieiice and clemoti/Iratioji, 

 1 would fuggeft the following conliderations : 



And, in the frjl place, if they believe that there is a God, and that htf 

 is the author of the univerfe, they muft admit the diftindlion betwixt 

 the intelledual and the material or vifible world, and, confequently, 

 that there are ideas, at leaft in the Divine Mind ; for, however they 

 may confound fenfations and ideas in the human mind, where both 

 undoubtedly exift, it is impoffible they can believe that the Deity can 

 have any perception by organs of fenfe ; fo that nothing can be in 

 his mind but ideas, which every Theift muft believe to be the pattern 

 and exemplar of the vifible world. It muft therefore be evident, to all 

 thofe who are not Atheifts, that there are ideas exifting, at leaft, in one 

 mind ; and from thence he may conclude, that it is not impoflible that 

 the human mind may fo far participate of the Divine Nature, as to be 

 able to form ideas, infinitely lefs perfed, no doubt, than thofe of the 

 Divine Mind ; and with thi« remarkable difference, that our ideas, in 



S f 2 this 



