328 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 



modern^ phllofophifes in this way, is what Arlftotle makes, that there 

 is fomething elfe in the univerfe befides matter and motion ; for there 

 is that which is immoveable, without generation or corruption, mean- 

 ing ideas *. 



I think I may therefore conclude, that thofe who deny the exigence 

 of ideas, are not only perfedly ignorant of the antient philofophy, 

 but of the nature of fcience, and of truth in general. 



Having thus cleared my way to the Categories, I will proceed to 

 make fome obfervations upon them in the next chapter. 



CHAP. 



*His words are, Et< V aliuirtftiv uvr»Oi vTriXxftfixiltf Kxt uXXri> »vfikv inxi TUf oiTui, ji at/T« 



*<»»«■<« ivx^^iiy auTi cpSc^x, ovTt yine-ii r» irugetvuD- Metaph. lib. 4. Cap. 5. This fcn- 

 tence alone, I think, would be fufficient to acquit Ariftotle of any imputation of 

 materialifm ; for, as ideas are undoubtedly immaterial things, it is impoflible to con- 

 ceive how the foul, if material, could produce them j for what is immaterial never 

 can come from what is material. 



