Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 335 



refulting, has each its proper place in the philofophical arrangements 

 of Archytas. 



Thus, I think, I have fhown, that there is nothing wanting in the 

 univerfals of Archytas ; and, as it is admitted that they are not too 

 many, it follows, that the fyftem is compleat, without either redun- 

 djincy or defedt. 



But, as to Ariftotle's logical work of the categories, as it was in- 

 tended for a fyftem of univerfal praedicables, I doubt it cannot be faid 

 to be compleat, without thofe univerfals that 1 have mentioned, fuch 

 as motion^ matter^ form^ poiver^ faculty ^^z, which are certainly^r^^^i- 

 cableSi and are, accordingly, often praedicated. And Ariftotle himfelf 

 feems to have been confcious of this dete<5t in the fyftem, as he has 

 added, to the dodrine of the categories, a good deal concerning mo-- 

 tion^ habit i pri'vatioriy and oppofites. 



Thus, I have explained both the univerfals of Archytas, and the 

 categories of Ariftotle ; and have endeavoured to fhow that, whatever 

 defeats there may be in Ariftotle's categories, the fyftem of Archytas 

 is compleat. And I think I have afligned the reafon of the dift'crence 

 betwixt them, namely, that Archytas's work was truly a metaphyfical 

 work, but which Ariftotle by transforming into a logical work, has 

 made neither the one nor the other compleat. In the next chapter I 

 will conclude this book, by comparing this univerfal fcience of cate- 

 gories, with other fciences, and particularly mathematics. 



G H A ^. 



