136 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 



CHAP. IV. 



The SuhjeEl of Metaphyfics^ Univerfals or Generals, of the hlghejl Kind 

 — What Generals are not to be underjlood ^without fome Knoivledge of 

 Logic — Difference betivixt Mathematics and Metaphyfics — Mathema" 

 tical Ideas — Number — This the SubjeSi of Arithmetic — Figure the Sub^ 

 jedi of Geometry — Analyfis of it into Superficies^ Lines^ and Points—* 

 Motion — This the Subject both of Geometry and Arithmetic — The Sub- 

 je5ls of Metaphyfics — Confiders ivhat is different^ and ivh at is common,, 

 in the Subjects of Mathematics — Its iVay of confidering Motion. — 

 Treats of Subje^s not comprehended in any particular Science — The 

 proper SubjeSi of Metaphyfics is immaterial Subfiances — The Way of 

 coming to the Idea of them — Difference betivixt Ant tent and Modern 

 Philofophy — Nofufficient Caufe of Motion affigned by the Moderns — 

 Nature^ according to their Syftem^ defe^live. 



THOSE who believe, like the antlent philofophers mentioned by 

 Plato, that nothing exifts but what they can grafp or lay hold 

 of with their hands, will uo doubt think this whole dodrine of cate- 

 gories to be merely phantaftical, without any foundation in truth or 

 reality — umbrarum hic locus efl^ according to them ; and they will fay, 

 that fuch airy unfubftantial notions are altogether unworthy of a fci- 

 ence, which pretends to treat only of things really exifting. The phi- 

 lofophers I mean are thofe who deny the exiftence of generals, 

 even in the mind, and afTert that there is nothing there but the 

 perception of fingular and individual things; and the plain fcope 

 of which philofophy, as I have fliown elfewhere, is, to exclude 



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