Chap. L A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 355 



has bady nor ivili have an exldence ; and is nowife diftinguiflied from 

 the pa/^ a.nd future J but as a boundary betwixt the two ; which I have 

 fhown is no part of time, any more than a point is of a line. 



Laflly^ It is true what Ariftotle obferves *, that, as motion is the 

 meafure of Time, fo Time is the meafure of motion ; for, by applying 

 Time to motion, we fay, that one motion is quicker or flower than an- 

 other, or lafts longer or (horter time than another. But it is to be 

 obferved, that, from motion, we muft firft have formed a meafure of 

 Time, before we can fo apply it ; fo that it is ftill true, that it is from 

 motion only that Time originally proceeds. And, 2^0, The reafon why 

 Time can be applied to motion is, that it is of a nature perfectly fimilar, 

 and therefore like meafures like ; but it cannot be applied to magni- 

 tude, whofe parts are co-exiftent ; nor to number, whofe parts are dif- 

 crete, unlefs by accident '\ ; as, when we fay that a road is four hours 

 long, or a number is four times as great as another, the meaning of 

 which is, that the motion by which the journey is to be performed 

 will continue four hours, and that the operation of multiplying the 

 leflTer number muft be four times repeated in order to make it equal to 

 the greater. 



From thefe confideraiions, the truth of what I fald in the beginning 

 of this chapter is ftill further apparent, viz. that Time cannot be ap- 

 plied to any being of ftable and permanent duration^ without change 

 or variation of any kind, but only to beings that are in a conftant flux, 

 and always changing, either as to their fubftance, or their qualities and 

 energies. The common diftinftion, therefore, betwixt Eternity and 

 Time appears to be well founded ; the former only applying to a being 



Yy 2 with- 



* Ibid. cap. 18. § 6. et feq, 



t I ufe the word accident here in the fenfe that Ariftotle ufes the word c-vff.liifii^x.o{f 

 to denote a property that we afcribe to a thing that does not arife from the nature of 

 the thing itfelf, but from fomething elfc which we conGder as conne6ted with it- 

 'i'hus, the property of Time, which we afcribe to a road, does not belong to the road, 

 qua road, but to the motion we make in travelling that road. 



