Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 369 



This erroneous notion of Space has led Mr Leibnitz to the abfur- 

 dity of faying, that, fuppofing the whole fyftem of the vifible world 

 to be moved out of the place which it prefently occupies, into fome 

 other portion of Space, beyond the limits of this univerfe, ftill it would 

 be in the fame Space, provided the order and arrangement of the bo- 

 dies, with refpedl to one another, was continued the fame. And his 

 imperfedt notion of Time has made him fay, that, if the world had 

 been created a thoufand years fooner, it w^ould have been created at 

 the fame time, provided there had been the fame order of fucceffive 

 things. . ,i )«-ii, '-■;•..-.(; 



This is the opinion of Mr Leibnitz concerning Space — Let us next 

 examine that of his antagonift Dr Clarke. He has not given us any 

 precife definition of Space ; but he has told us, jirjl^ That it is fome- 

 thing, and not abfolutely nothing, idiy^ That it is not an idea mere- 

 ly, but has fome real exiftence. 3^/y, That it is not the bare relation 

 of one thing to another, arifing from their order or fituation among 

 themfelves. 4//^/^, That it is not Body. 5^^/^, That it is not fub- 

 ftance of any kind : And from thence he infers, that it is a property 

 or accident^ ; and, as what is an accident muft, of neceflity, be acci- 

 dent of fome fubftance, he has faid that it is an accident or proper- 

 ty of God f. 



In examining this opinion of the Dodor, which appears to me al- 

 together new, and, if there be any truth in it, a difcovery made by 

 the Dodtor himfelf, let us firfl: inquire what is meant by faying, that 

 any thing is property or attribute of a fubftance. And the meaning 



Aaa I 



• Page 305. of the Colleaion of thefe Letters in French and Englilh. 

 ■f Ibid, page 77. 127. I2C). 



