570 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 



I take to be no other than this, that It is a quahty inherent in the fub- 

 ftance. If it be fuch a quahty, that the fubftance cannot exift with- 

 out it, then it is what we call an ejjential property ; but, if it be only 

 fuch a quality of the fubftance, that it may be away, and yet the 

 fubftance exift, then it is faid to be an accidental property .^ or an ac- 

 cident, in the ftrideft fenfe of the word. Mow, of this latter kind, 

 it will be admitted, that there is nothing, in the Divine nature, but, 

 that all the qualities which w^e afcribe to Deity are ejfential attributes, 

 exifting neceflarily, as well as the fubftance to which they belong. If, 

 therefore, it be true, that Space is a property of the Deity, it muft be 

 an eflential part of the Divine Nature. 



Againft this opinion of the Dodor, I think Mr Leibnitz argues 

 well, when he fays, that if Space, in general, be part of the Divinity, 

 fo muft every part of Space. And this Divine attribute muft be di- 

 vifible into an infinite number of parts. Nor do I well underftand 

 the Doctor's anfwer, when he fays, that Space is indivifible except in 

 idea ; for, though it be not divifible, like matter, the parts of which 

 can not only be bounded and diftinguiftied one from another, but 

 difcerpted, ox feparated one from another, which the parts of Space 

 cannot be, it is likewife true what Mr Leibnitz fays, that, by lines 

 drawn, or fuperficiefes interpofed, the feveral parts of Space may be 

 adually divided and diftinguifhed one from another. 



Further, if Space be an eflential attribute of the Deity, Why (hould 

 not Matter, which fills that Space, be alfo a part of the Deity ? for, 

 however low or vile a thing Matter may appear to be, it feems to be 

 of greater dignity and eminence than that which only contains it ; 

 for, out of Matter, as I before obferved, joined with Form, all the dif- 

 ferent Speciefes of corporeal things are made. 



What 



