376 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 



All the perceptions of the human mind are either ideas or percep- 

 tions of fenfe, that is, they are perceptions, either of generals, or of par- 

 ticular 



Thii way of analyzing propofitions into their praedicate and fubje£l, is, I think, 

 ufcfuJ, efpecially when the propcrition is much involved, which is the cafe when the 

 praedicatc, or fubje£t, or both, are expreiTed, not by one word, but by fereral words, 

 perhaps feveral fentences : For, though Man, for exannple, be the fubje(5l of a pro- 

 pofition, yet, it may be msn, in fach circumftances, as will require feveral fenteii- 

 ces to exprefs. And, in like manner, what is praedicated of INIan, may be a thing 

 that cannot be expreffed, except in many words ; yet, foi all this, the propofition is 

 but one fimple propofition. And this happens, not only in propofitions requiring 

 proof, but in axioms or felf« evident propofitions, which one fliould think the fimpleft 

 of all propofitions ; as, for example, in the firll axiom of Euclid, that things equal to 

 the fame thing are equal to one another, Equality is predicated, not of any two or 

 more things in general, but of two or more things that are equal to the fame thing : 

 So that here the fubjeft of the propofition cannot be exprefled without feveral 

 words. 



The exprefilon of our EngliHi language is fo imperfeQ, that we often cannot- diflli>. 

 guifli whether the propofition be affirmative or negative} whereas, in Greek, that is 

 clearly dillinguiflied by the arrangement of the words. For example, «>i'g«y5re; irrn 

 4v}iKtttn, is an affirmative propofition, the praedicate of which is, notjujiy that being 

 affirmed, of Man ; whereas, cot^curci «i>* te-Tt* J<je«td?, is a negative propofition, the 

 praedicate /t{y? being denied of Man. And the reafon of the difference is, that the 

 negative cu being prefixed to hicuioi, is underftood to be joined with ^ixtcieif fo as to 

 make the praedicate of the propofition *w ttKcuciy notju/i; whereas, when it is prefixed 

 to the verb irri*, it is conftrued with that verb, and makes the propofition negative. 

 But, in Englifln, as we cannot put the negative before the verb, but only after it, we 

 can only fay, Man is notjujiy which is altogether ambiguous, and may be underftood, 

 either as an affirmative or a negative propofition. In this inftance, the fenfe is pretty 

 much the fame, whether the propofition be confidered as affirmative or negative ; but, 

 in other inftances, the difference will be very great ; as, for example, myS^MTrti \vi»rtu 

 ttw T^iyjit^ is an affirmative propofition, where the capacity of not running is affirmed of 

 Man. But xf6^»7rei cu ^uictreti r^i^iiv^ is a negative propofition, which denies that the 

 capacity of running belongs to Man ; yet, in Engliffi, we can exprefs thefe two propo- 

 fitions, fo different in their fenfe, only in one way, viz. Man camiQt run j and, for 



the 



