Chap. 11. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 379 



CHAP. ir. 



Common Senfe not fnfficient for cxplainhig the Principles of Evidence or 

 Certainty — nor any Learning to he found in Engliflj or in French — 

 }Ar Locke's otvn Account of his E fay —His Mijiake of the Axiom of 

 the Schools i upon ivhich he builds his ivhole Ifork^ is a fundamental 

 Error of his Book — Of General Propofitions^ that isy Propojitions of 

 ivhich both the Terms are general — Mr Lockers Account of the Truth 

 of Juch Propojitions very i7nperfed — The Relation betivixt the tivo 

 Terms of the P ropofition-, Juch as is neccfjary to moke the Propofttion 

 true, particularly explained — All Propojitions cither affirm or deny a 

 Genus of a Species, or an Accident of a Subftance. 



TH O S E of my readers, who are not learned, will be furprifed to 

 find tbat fo many difiind:ions, and nice dilcriminations of things, 

 arc required to inform them what Evidence is ; and they will be apt 

 to fay, what an Englifh Judge faid to a Jury, who afked him that 

 queftion, * That every thing is Evidence which they think is fuch.* 

 Common Jenje^ they will fay, is fufficient to let us know what 

 Certainty and Convidion are, and when we ought to be con- 

 vinced, and when not. But I will tell them, that, not only 

 common Jtnfe is not fufficient for this purpofe, but even the moft 

 micommonjenje^ and the greatefl natural genius j and that, in order 

 to know what truth and I'cience are, they muft either have nivented 

 themlelves a great fyfiem of icience, fuch as Ariftotlc has delivered in 



B b b 2 his 



