38o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV. 



his books of Analytics, or they mufl: have learned it from others. And 

 I will further add, that, if they are to be taught, it mud be by good 

 mafters, living or dead. As to dead mafters, I mean authors who have 

 written books upon the fubject, I am afraid there are none either ia 

 Engliili or French, that will much inftrua them. Our only ftandard 

 book of the philofophy of Mind is Mr Locke's Eflay upon the Hu- 

 man Underrtanding, of which he is fo modelt as to give this account 

 in his preface, ' That fome hafty and undigefted thoughts, on a fub- 



* ]eCt never before confidered, gave the firft entrance to his Effay ; 

 ' which, begun by chance, was continued by entreaty, written by in- 



* coherent parcels, and, after long intervals of negled, refumed again, 

 ' as humour or occafion permitted.' That there Ihould be any de- 

 gree of perfedion in fuch a work, cannot be expeded. And, indeed, 

 to a man of learning and philofophy, it appears no other than a hafty 

 colledion of crude undigefted thoughts, by a man who thought and 

 reafoned by himfelf, upon fubjedts of the grcateft difficulty, and deep- 

 eft fpeculation, without the affiftance of learning ; for, that he was 

 not an antient fcholar, or learned in antient philofophy, is apparent. 

 And, in his time, there was hardly any thing in French and Englifh 

 books that deferved the name of philofophy ; and the philofophy of 

 the fchoolmen was then almoft entirely out of fafhion. He has, howe- 

 ver, adopted one maxim of it, and made it thefoundation of his whole 

 fyftem ; but a maxim abfolutely falfe, in the fenfe in which he has 

 underftood it. The maxim I mean is, thdil Nihil ejl in intdk^u quod 

 non prius fuit in Jtnfu *. Upon the credit of which, he has confound- 

 ed fenfations and ideas, generals and particulars. But it is no maxim 

 of Ariftotle, who has every where moft carefully diftinguifhed betwixt 

 fenfe and inteiled:, and, cosilcquemly, betwixt their different objeds, 

 fenfations and ideas. And, though i believe the ichoolmen meant it 



ia 



• See what I have faid of this maxim, p. 113. where I have obferved, that, though 

 it be not true of the intellt^) it is true of the phantafia. 



