402 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 



it is a fpecies ;. then the fyllogifm into propofitions ; and, laft- 

 ly, propofitions into fimple terms, which are the elements of this 

 fcience. Beginning, therefore, with terms, without which propofi- 

 tions arc not to be underftood, he proceeds to propofitions; from: 

 propofitions he goes to fyllogifm ; and from fyllogifm in gene- 

 ral, he proceeds to the demonftrative fyllogifm ; which, wiihout 

 the knowledge of what fyllogifm in general is, cannot be under- 

 ftocd. 



Thus much, I hope, will be fufficient to fhow the method that A- 

 riftotle has followed in this great work, and that this, and no other 

 method, was proper to make a fcience of it. But, as to particulars, it: 

 would not be proper that I fhould enter into them, as I do not write a 

 logical, but a metaphyfical work. 1 Vi^ill, therefore, only add as much- 

 as will be necelfary to fhow the nature of demon/oration, or fcienti- 

 fjcal truth, and of other evidence of an inferior kind. 



And, Jir/i, as to demonftration, it is not only neceflary that the 

 terms of the propofition, to be connedled in this way, fhould be ideas 

 or generals, but alfo, that the middle term, conneding them, fhould 

 be of that kind ; And that middle term either fhould be an axiom, 

 or it fhould be conneded with each of the two terms, by fome 

 axiom, or, which is the fame thing, by fome propofition before de- 

 monftrated. 



But, before the two terms of the propofition to be demonflrated can 

 be thus conneded, we muft know perfedly the nature of the two. 

 terms, that is, the praedicate and fubjed, as well as of the term by 

 which they are to be conneded ; for, otherways, it will be impoflible 

 to know that they are neccffarily conneded. Now, it is by definition 

 that the nature and effence of any thing is made known ; and hence 

 it appears, that definition, as well as, axioms, is abiolutely neceffary 



for 



