Chap. Vr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 417 



conception of what Is called a natural or inftln£tlve belief; inftln£t, in 

 the way I have explained it *, and as I believe the word is generally 

 underftood, Is a principle of adtion, directing all the appetites and in- 

 clinations of the brute-animals, and many of ours : But it has nothing 

 to do with opinion or belief ; and, accordingly, the brute-animals 

 have neither : It is only the intelligent animal who forms opinions, 

 and believes. Now, it is impoffible that intelledl can believe any 

 thing without a reafon. And of this no man can have the leaft 

 doubt, who has learned his logic, and who knows how ideas are 

 formed, and how they are put together in propofitions, in which the 

 mind either gives a direcfi and imnediate aflent, upon the grounds I 

 have mentioned, or is convinced of the truth of them by ratiocina- 

 tion. 



All, therefore, that can be made of this argument, in favour 

 of the exiftence of maiter, is, that none of the vulgar have any 

 doubt of it. But this general belief will not fatisfy the philofo- 

 pher, who will fay, that, in our dreams, we fee and hear moft 

 diftindly, and have other very ftrong impreflions of the objeds of 

 fcnfe. Thefe objeds, however, have no real exiftence, or, at leaft, 

 do not operate upon our fenfes j and yet, while our dreams continue, 

 we have no more doubt of the exiftence of them, than we have of the 

 exiftence of the like objeds when we are awake ; and, even when we 

 are awake, we have conceptions of objeds which we are fure do not 

 exift, fuch as the images we conceive of mountains of gold, Hippo- 

 centaurs, Gorgons, Chimaeras, and the like. Now, the^defenders of this 

 fceptlcal philofophy will fay. Why may not our perceptions of fenfe^ 

 be fuch as our dreams, and very often our waking thoughts are — mere 

 fancies and creatures of the mind, without any real objeds? Nor, in- 

 deed, have I yet heard any good anfwer to this argument ; for, that 



^ ZZ we 



"• See, above, pages 138. 221. 



