Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 419 



or even of a mind in the univerfe ; fur I do not remember that ever he 

 was branded with the name of Atheift. The glory, therefore, ap- 

 pears to be referved for Mr Hume, to difpute the exiftence of both 

 mind and body^ and to differ in this refped, not only from the vul- 

 gar, but from all the philofophers that had been before him. But I 

 do not think that he has fhown abilities or learning fufficient to fup- 

 port his pretenfions to fo much fuperior wifdom. Thus much, at 

 leaft, might have been expeded of him, that he (hould have faid fome- 

 thing to reconcile the two opinions, the one with the other, and to 

 convince us how things could go on in the world as they do, fuppo- 

 fing all to be a dream, without either mind or body ; for all the philo- 

 fophers before his time, who were Atheifts, were, at the fame time, 

 Materialifts, and endeavoured to account for every thing in nature, 

 and all the operations of men, our waking thoughts as well as our 

 dreams, from mere matter and motion. Whereas Mr Hume, taking 

 away matter, and, by confequence, motion, denying the exiftence of 

 mind alfo, has left nothing in the univerfe, befides his own perceptions, 

 which are produced by no caufe that he affigns, and are an accident 

 without a fubftance. What a ftrange face of nature is this ! and what 

 an extraordinary philofophy muft this appear to any man who has but 

 learned the elements of logic \ 



A man who maintains opinions fo very fingular, and which lead 

 to fuch extraordinary confequences, fhould be able to bring the cleareft 

 proof of them; fuch as, that it is impoffible, or implies a contradic- 

 tion, that the contrary opinion fliould be true : And particular- 

 ly, with regard to this queftion concerning the exiftence of mat- 

 ter, he {hould be able to fliow, that the idea of a fubftance ha- 

 ving folidity, impenetrability, refiftence, extenfion alfo, and figure, 

 implies a contradiction. But this he has not fo Jmuch as attempt- 

 ed to prove ; and therefore it muft be fuppofed that it is at leaft 

 poflible that body may exift ; from which a philofophy altogether 

 different from Mr Hume's would infer, that it docs adually exift. 



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