424 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 



Further, that we have ideas, as well as perceptions by the fenfe, of 

 fenfible objeds, I think it is impofTible to deny. A geometer, for ex- 

 ample, has undoubtedly the idea of lines and figures, concerning 

 which he demonftrates {■•> many things. Now, I would defire to 

 know of thofe fceptical pliilofophers from whence we got thefe ideas. 

 The common account given of them is, that they are abftradled by 

 the mind from fenfible obje»Ss. Now, if that be not the true account, 

 I defire to know of thofe philofophers in what other way we come 

 by them ? If they cannot anfwer this queftion, they muft acknow- 

 ledge that their philofophy is very detedive, as they cannot affign 

 any caufe for fo common a phaenomenon, of which it is impoilible to 

 <ieny the exiflence. The only anfwer, that I think it is poffible to 

 make, is one or other of thele two ; either, that thofe ideas are innate, 

 and born with us, or, that they are communications made to us by 

 fuperior minds. But 1 anfwer both thefe hypothefes by afki»ig ano- 

 ther very fimple queftion, Why has not the blind man the idea of 

 colours, or the deaf man of founds, either innate, or by communication 

 with other minds ? 



As to what is faid, that, if the objeds of the perceptions of our 

 fenfes were any thing external, our perceptions, which Mr Hume 



choofes 



able, and therefore I will give them. ^O.^s t' «w»5 ten to utr^ATo)/ ^»vo», tvhr xi £<« ^q 



*VT<«» Ttiy %iA\!^v/,iif. «<7.9-y,j-<; yag o-jk oty em- t» ct-iv cv> /tt^TS tk. cii<rBnT» Htxt, fcr,Ti tx ec,i7^v\f/.xTctf 

 ie-0$ tiXijiiS' fi'J V«e ecir^xvouivo-j tt^^oj tovt* I'^rt. tt oi ftc V!T«z:-if<,iyci ^n iiixi « vtni tj))" atjc- 

 ^n<rii, zxi rt»Z'J airS->!<ri/wj, os^^viXToy. ov yn^ o/i ^y «ie-^»r<f, «vt« invtm i<rrtP, ctXX* tvTt T« 

 * Ttgov x«r« Tj)' at<(r^i)(r<» a xTiwyKn -x^an^ot nvxi tm «6(5-9iirl«f. to yaf Kitouy rai/ niyovf^i^ov (pv(rtt 

 iT^tTiscv ic-Ti. Meiaph. lib. 4. cap. 5. injine. He adds, K«< n Xtyirxt tt^o^ xXMXx txv- 

 xa x\i7Uy ou^y r,rrcy ; which is ftating ail obje-£lion to himfelf, viz. that what moves, 

 an4 what is moved, fall under the category of relatitn^ or v^oi t<, and are, as we exprefs 

 it, CQ relatives y and therefore muft exift together. But the anfwer is, that, though the 

 one, therefore, cannot, in time, be prior to the other, yet it may be in dignity, and the 

 order of nature, as the caufe muft neceflarily be to the effc£l, though both may have 

 been from all eternity, which is tlie cafe, according to Ariftotle, of the univerfe and 

 its author. 



