Chap. IX. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 455 



* therefore we can have no idea of God*s being the author of the uni- 



* verfe.' 



To refute this fo impious aflertion, does not belong to this part of 

 my work ; nor is it neceiTary, I would fain hope, for the greater part 

 of my readers. But fome of Mr Hume's fchool having, as I faid, car- 

 ried his dodlrine of our having no idea oi caufe and effe5ly fo far as to 

 overturn the principles, not only of theology, but of every other 

 fcience, and of all demonftration, I think it is proper, in this place, 

 to vindicate thofe principles, and to defend them againft fuch an at- 

 tack, which is grounded, as I think I fhall be able to fliow, upon ab- 

 folute ignorance of the nature of fcience and demonftration. 



That, in all demonftration and reafoning a priori^ we argue from 

 generals to particulars ; as, on the contrary, in reafoning by induc- 

 tion, we argue from particulars to generals, is a fad: that cannot be 

 denied. And further, it is equally certain, that the particulars which 

 are inferred from the generals are fome way or another connecled'w'Mh 

 them ; fo that they are not only conjoined but conneBed, Here, there- 

 fore, is that connexion which Mr Hume defiderates with refpecS to 

 fads or events ; for which reafon, he denies that we have any idea of 

 the one being the caufe of the other. The only queftion, therefore, 

 is. Whether the connedion, which undoubtedly is betwixt the gene- 

 rals and particulars from them inferred, or, in other words, betwixt 

 the premifles and conclufion, in demonllrative reafoning, is fuch a 

 connedion as that upon which we beftow the name of caiijc and ef- 

 fe6i? 



That the two firft propofitions in a fyllogifm are the caufe of the 

 conclufion, has been the opinion of all phdoldphers ever fince there 

 was a fyuem of logic known j and, particularly, it is the opinion of 



Ariitotle, 



