Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 465 



only exifted in the mind of an intelligent being. Originally, accor- 

 ding to him, they exift in the divine intelledt, where they form what 

 we call the intelkElual world. From thence proceeds the material 

 world, which is a copy of all iho^t forms or ideas, primarily exiting 



N n n in 



the contrary opinion, that it is only a conception of our minds, and exifts only there, is 

 ftated and endeavoured to be refuted p. 1 1 13. And there is a pafTage in the Sophijlay 

 p. 174. Edit. Ficini, where he fpeaks of ideas, not only as haring a feparate exiftence, 

 but teils us what fort of beings they are, viz. beings endowed both with life and in- 

 telligence. And, indeed, it is impoflible that he could have fpoken of them in fo my- 

 flerious a manner, as he has done in the PhilebuSf and many other dialogues, repre- 

 fenting them as beings of a moft wonderful kind, which, continuing always one and 

 the fame, do neverthelefs exift entire and undivided, in an infinite number of things 

 at the fame time, if he had believed them to be only notions in the mind of an intel- 

 ligent being. 



Nor do I think that Arlflotle has done his mafter any injuftice in reprefenting his o- 

 pinion to be, that the ideas were in paiticular and material things »«r« fcihli*, or f>y 

 participation, not *;«#' 'o,tta («*,««, or as a copy. Ariftotle's Mctaphyf. lib 2. cap. 6. For 

 though, in the ParmeniJes, he ftates both opinions, yet, I think it is evident, from 

 what he fays there, and likewife from fome paflages in the Philebus, and other parts 

 of his works, that his opinion was, that the ideas exifted in particular things by par- 

 ticipation. And it is further true, what Ariflotle hys, di&o /ceo, that he has nowhere 

 explained the nature oi \.\\\s participation, but every where talks of it as a moft myde- 

 rious thing. 



And Ariflotle has not only truly ftated the opinion of his mafter upon this fubie£t 

 but he has accounted how he came to be of that opinion ; for, fays he, In bis younger 

 days, he learned the philofophy of ileraclitus, which taught, that all material things 

 were in a conftant flux, fo that of them there could be no fcicnce; and this opinion 

 he retained to the laft. l>ut having ftudied the philofophy of morals under Socrates, 

 and having learned from him to inveftigate generals, and to dejine, he thought that it 

 was impcflible there could be any definition of material or particular things, which 

 were continually changing ; and therefore he fuppofed another kind of beings, of 

 fixed and permanent exiftence, and which therefore were the proper objedls of defini- 

 tion and fcience. Thefe he calLd IdeaSy and faid they only were the t« •»t<k, or ihiiws 

 really cxijling ; and therefore to find out this t* •> upon any fubjc<fl, is, in the language 

 of Plato, to difcover the truth. See Ariftotle ubi/vpra, Mttaphyf. lib. i. cap. 6. 



