Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 471 



Neither have they a lefs real exiftence becaufe chey do not exift fe- 

 parately; for that is the caie of qualities or accidents, fuch as black and 

 white, round and fquare, which do not exift feparately, but neceflarily 

 in fubftances, yet have a real exiftence as well as the fubftances. In 

 like manner, ideas, though they exift only in particular fubftances, or 

 in the mind of fome iatelligent being, have a real exiftence. 



It makes, however, a difference, whether the idea exifts only in our 

 minds, or whether it does not likewife exift in particular and mate- 

 rial things. If it exift only in the firft manner, it is a mere notion, 

 and what the fchoolmen call an ens rationis, fuch as the idea of a 

 Chimaera, or a Hlppocentaur, or of any other animal that never exift- 

 ed. Whereas, if it exift not only in our mind, bit in fome material 

 thing, or, in other words, if the idea be produced into adl, then has it 

 what may be properly called a real exiftence. 



To conclude, the whole argument concerning the exiftence of ideas 

 comes to this : Not only the philofopher, but every the moft vulgar 

 man, diftinguifties, in the works of art, betwixt the mutter Sind the 

 form, obferving, tiiat the fame matter takes various forms, according 

 to the pleafure of the artift, and different matter the fame forni : He 

 therefore thinks and fpeaks of theyorw, without taking into his con- 

 fideration the 7natter of which it may be made ; and this form, even 

 in common language, is called the idea of the thing. In like manner, 

 the various natural fubftances, with which we are furrounded, have 

 various fhapes, texture, and conformation of parts, and other qualities 

 and properties, which difcriminate them one from another, and make 

 every thing to be whit it is» in contradiftindion to every other tiling. 

 Thefe conftitute (he form of fuch fubftances; and, when wc have got a 

 clear and diftind notion of this form, we are faid to have an icica of the 

 thing ; and this idea, likewife, we coiifider as diftind from the matter., 

 of which we have no diftind notion at all, but only a confufed appre- 



henfion 3, 



