Chap. XL A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 475 



In all thefe inHances, k is manifefl:, that the more general idea is 

 confidered as a ivhole^ and the lei's general as a part ; and upon this 

 relation of the one to the other the conclufion of the argument alto- 

 gether depends. And, accordingly, in this way Ariitotle has ex- 

 plained the principle of fyllogifm *. 



O o o 2 But 



* His way of exprefling, that the more general idea contains the whole of the lefs 

 general, is, that the former is y-xT» vxvro'; of the latter. And the way he exprefles the 

 relation of the lefs general to the more general, is by faying, that the lefs general is 

 «» «Aai of the more general. The cxpreiTions, therefore, denote the fame thing, only 

 confidered in different refpe£ts. His words are. To ^5 iv ixv e^vxi It-^ov In^fj y.ct ro 



x.x,rx TfuVTOi KiiTriye^^a-^xi ^xneov 6xri^ov, locurnv la-Ti. Myo^Aii ^6 to kxtx TrxvTCi y-arnyo^fio-^xty 



Ircv ^■/\^i)i vj rov vTroKet^ivov Xx^i^v, xx6^ on ^xri^ov^»v My^&fitriTxt. j4na!yt. Prior cap. I. in fins. 

 And, in the beginning of the 4th chapter thereafter, he exprefles the relation of the 

 three terms of the fyllogifm to one another in the fallowing words : 'Ot^f oyv l^oi r^^/j 



evrui sp^erf(ri wf«5 asAAijAoi/j, *6iij-Ti rov ia-^xToy if oXa fiJxi rm fA.Z'rai^ y.xi rov /atrov ev oAai rco 



TTfuTM «v<e<, -/j jwjj «vfl!;, xvxyK/i Tftic xK^uv Hvxi (TuXXoyKrf^av tsAmov. And, in an after pafl'age 

 of the fame book, he fays exprefsly, that, if the one idea is not to the other as a 

 •whole is to a part, and, if that other is not to a third as a part to a ivhole^ there is no 



fyllogifm : 'OXug yx^ « ft>j Ett/v, •»? oXev TT^Oi ui^oi, y.xi xAXo 5r»«; toito 'w? y.lpo^ TOOi cXov. s^ 

 cvGtvii tm TitouTtfvi'iiiiVv(riti I ditxvvuv av^i yx^ yivirxi a-vX\oyi'7jxai. Ibid^ cap. 4.. 



The only inftances I have given of fyllogifms are thofe whofe conclufions are either 

 univerfal affirmatives, or univerfal negatives, or, in Ariftotle's language, that are t'x- 

 thtr Kxrx 7rx*r6i;, or x.xrx f.t,/,^ivoiy becaufe I would not embarrais the argument with 

 fyllogifms whofe conclufions are either particular affirmatives, or particular negatives; 

 that is, as Ariflotle has exprefled it, either kxtx nyoi, or oj kxtx T<»af, or, what is the 

 fame thing, «w xxrx Travros. But the reafon of the thing is the fame with refpT^t to 

 thefe particular propofitions, and with refpe£l to the univerfal ; becaufe v.-hat is the 

 rule for the whole, muft alio be the rule for the part. Ihus, if A contain B wholly, 

 and B contain a part of C -, then will A contain a part of C ; that is, the conclufion 

 will be a particular affirmative. Again, if A exclude I> wholly, and B includes a part 

 of C, then will A t-xclude a part of C ; where the conclufion is a particular negative, 

 or ov X.XTX vttvTci And, as all the conclufions of fyllogifm muft ol necrllity be cither 

 affirmative or negative, and each of thefe cither general or particular, wc have 

 here a (hort view of the whole doflrine of fyllogifm, whi h manifeftly depends upon . 

 the principle of one idea containing, or not containing another, as a part of it. 

 * 



