558 DISSERTATION ON 



here he plainly diftingulflies this adive principle from the matter 

 which It moves, and, as there is nothing in the univerfe but matter 

 and Mind, I would fain believe that Sir Ifaac, by aflive prin- 

 ciple here, meant Mind, though he does not call it by that name. 

 If fo, he fairly gives up his fuhtih fpirity his firft law of mo- 

 tion, fo far as it relates to the continuation of it, and, in fhort, 

 his whole mechanical fyftem, and adopts the phllofophy of the 

 antients, which I defend. But, if I am to quote Sir Ifaac*s words, I 

 mufi: quote them fairly ; and I muft own that, in an after paflage in 

 the fame Query, he appears to return again to the mechanical fyftem ; 

 for he there fays, * That, though the world could not rife out of chaos 



* by the mere laws of Nature, yet, being once formed, it may conti- 



* nue, by thefe laws, for many ages *.* Now, by the laivs of Nature y 

 It is well known, that, in the language of his phllofophy, is meant the 

 laws of matter and motion ; and, tho* he has faid elfewhere, that the 

 fyftem might, fome time or another, need the mending hand of the 

 Creator, he has explained how he thought that might come to pafs, 

 not by any defed of the mechanical power, by which, he fuppofes, 

 the fyftem of the heavens is carried on, but chiefly by means of co- 

 mets traverfing the orbits of the planets, and difturbing their motions. 

 How to reconcile thefe paflages one with another, or how to deter- 

 mine which are the firft, and which the laft thoughts of Sir Ifaac up- 

 on this fubje£t, I muft own I do not well know : But, I think, it 

 would have been better that his followers had laid hold of the two firft 

 paflages I have quoted, as the real fentiments of Sir Ifaac, than to en- 

 deavour, as they have done, to defend his mechanical fyftem of the 

 heavens. 



Thus 



thofe aRive principles which he fuppofes to be In all bodies. This is precifely my o« 

 pinion, with fome difference in the exprefljon ; for what he calls a^ive principle I call 

 Mind^ as knowing no other aftive principle, that is, which has a^ivity in itfelf, and 

 of its own nature, in the univerfe* 

 * Pa^e 378. 



