Chap.IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 23 



This manner^ indeed, we cannot explain ; but we ought to be con- 

 tented to know as much of Mind as we do of Body, with which we 

 are fo much converfant. Now, extenfion is but a property of Body, 

 an eflential property indeed, but not Body itfelf, as the Cartefians 

 would make it. There is fomething^ therefore, which is extended ; 

 for extenfion is not a mere ideal abftraclion, fuch as length from 

 breadth, but Body is really fomething without its dimenfions or 

 bounds : So that we are obliged, whether we will or not, to come 

 back to the antient notion of a uXn, or Jirji matter^ which has been 

 attempted to be fo much ridiculed. Now, if any man can tell me 

 how he can conceive that this Firft Matter can exift without di- 

 menfions, I will tell him how I can conceive that Mind exifts, and 

 exifts in Space^ without having either length, breadth, or depth. 

 The fadttruly is, that we know nothing, either of Mind or Body, but 

 by their operations ; and we know that both Mind and Body ope- 

 rate in Space, and therefore exifl in Space : But, as to their man- 

 ner of exiftence, we can fay nothing with any certainty, except that 

 Body cannot exift in Body, that is, two Bodies cannot occupy the 

 fame fpace ; whereas, we know that Mind can exift in Body, and 

 occupy the fame fpace that Body occupies ; for that is the cafe 

 when Mind animates Body. Now this appears to me to fhow evi- 

 dently that Mind cannot be extended, nor occupy fpace in the man- 

 ner that Body does. 



I have been the fuller upon this fubjed, of the extenfion of Mind, 

 that I think it is an unwary conceflion which Dr Clarke has made 

 to the Materialifts, and of which, accordingly, I obferve that Dr 

 Prieftley hath availed himfelfin his difpute with Dr Price*, where he 

 {hows very clearly all the difficulties that thofe femi-materialifts, as 

 he very properly callsthem, run themfelves into. And, indeed, I muft 



own 



* Page 268. et feq. 



