28 



ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 



But none of thcra appear to have had the lead notion that Space 

 was either a fubftance by itfelf, or the quality of any other fub- 

 ftance. And Thcophraftus, the fucceflbr of Ariftotle, has faid ex- 

 prefsly, that Place, (which i^ nothing elfe than Space tilled with 

 Body), was no Being of itfelf, but only relative to the order and 

 pofition of Bodies *. It is, therefore, I think, a matter of great cu- 

 riolity, and alfo of great importance to the dodrine of Theifm, to 

 inquire whether the antients or the moderns are in the right in this 

 matter. 



The moderns, both Theifls and Atheifts, agree in this, that Space 

 is a Being ; whereas I agree with the antients, and fay, that it is no 

 Being itfelf, however necelfary it may be for the exiftence of other 

 B«ings. 



And, in ihejirft place, I fay, that, if it be a Being, it mufl: be ei- 

 ther Subftance or Accident ; for no man can conceive a Being that 

 is not either the one or the other. Now, it is certainly not Sub- 

 ftance ; for, if it were Subftance, it muft be either Body or Mind, 

 that is, material or immaterial ; becaufe, betwixt thefe two, it is Im- 

 poflible there can be any third Subftance. No man will fay that it 

 is Body; for it is Space without Body : And no philofopher, that ever 

 I heard of, maintained that it was Mind. The Atheifts, therefore, 

 are certainly miftaken when they make a fubftance of it. 



The only queftion, then, is, Whether it be an Accident ? Now, 

 the Accidents are reduced to nine clafles, as they are arranged by 

 Ariftotle, in his Book of Categories, which I hold to be the founda- 

 tion 



• This quotation from Theophraflus is prefcrved to us by Simpllcius, to whom 

 wc arc indebted for many paflages of authors now loft, in bis commentary upon 

 the 4th book of Ariftotle's Phyfics, fol. 149. 



