Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. :i:i 



thing as a quality of that thing, any more than we caa predicate 

 Space *. 



Vol. II. E CHAP. 



* See what I have further faid upon this fubjeft in vol. i. p. 347. I will only 

 add here, that Lucretius appears to me to have underftood very well the philofophy 

 •of Time, when he fays, 



Tempus item per fe non eft : Sed rebus ab ipfis 



Confequitur fenfus, tranfaftum quid fit in aevo : 



Turn quae res inftet ; quid porro deinde fequatur. 



Nee per fe quemquam tempus fentire, fatendum eft, 



Semotum ab rerum motu, placidaque quiete. Lib. i. v. 469. 



Where the Nature of Time, as only an adjunft and concomitant of things, not any 

 part of them, is very well explained ; and what is true of Time, is true alfo of Du- 

 ration; for Time is nothing but Duration bounded and meafured by Motion. And 

 what is true of Duration and Time, is alfo true of Space ; for it is no more than an 

 adjunct or concomitant, not a part or property, of any thing. 



