Chap.VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. jj 



not be moved, as I have (hown in the preceding volume * ; where- 

 as, the capacity of being moved is of the nature and eflenoe 

 of Body : So that it is impoflible that, when two things are fo 

 different, any argument can proceed from the one or the other. 

 idoy It is by its power of refledion that intelled is able to make 

 itfelf its own objed. Now, by this power, it is diftinguifhed, not 

 only from Body, but from every other Mtrtd. But he who fays, that 

 Body can refled, turn upon itfelf, and make itfelf Its own objed, 

 fpeaks without ideas, or without underftanding what he fays, and 

 defer ves no other anfwer. 



A propofition fo clear does not fland in need of any authority to 

 fupport it ; but there is one that has occurred to me, fmce publifhing 

 the Firft Volume, which I will here give the reader. It is from A- 

 riftotle, in his Phyfics, where he fays, that moving^ and being moved^ 

 are Relatives, belonging to the Categories oi doing 2,n6.fuffering ; and 

 therefore, what moves, moves what is movedy and what ;/ moved, is 

 moved by that which moves. I have quoted below the words in the 

 original *, where the learned reader will obferve, that there is a 

 clearnefs and emphafis, as well as concifenefs, in the expreffion, 

 which cannot be preferved in any Englifh tranflation. 



E 2 If 



* P. 72. 



■ + T«» li «•(>«{ Tl, T. ftU X.xf i;t!5«X1' ««' t^E-'t'" My«T«,, TO ^ ««T« T. ».(,T/K.», ««, 3-«^,. 



r,*n, Kett ixut k.f«T(««» t( xci ki»i|T»»- re yxf KUtirixot KH^riKtt xtu xiH)t«w, Ksti t» KHmtt 



xiitiTo^ Jx« T.u xi.ifTiK.i;. It is needlefs to quote more paffages, as indeed the fum of 

 his Phyfiology and Theology is, that, in the univerfe, there is fomething that is 

 moved, and fomething that moves ; txi r„ Kiuvfiiv,, W. t.»oj «/h.t«,, as Simplicius 

 cxprefles it in his Commentary upon the firft book of the Phyfics, p. 56. The one he 

 calls the Iaa, or Material Caufe of things, and the other the Efficient, which he 

 paraphrafes, by calling it the ««ir t! i^x." '■'nnui. I cannot, however, help quoting 

 one paffage more of the Metaphyfics, lib. i. cap. 3. where, giving a hiftory of the 

 opinions of the antients concerning the firft caufes of things, he tells us, that, af- 

 ter 



