Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 3^ 



And thus it appears, that, if Body cannot move itfclf, there is an 

 end of the fyftcm of Materialifm and Atheifm ; and every man who 

 admits this muft be a Theift, whether he will or not. 



If I am fuccefsful in this argument, it will fupply a defedl which 

 I obferve in Dr Clarke's Demonftration of the Being and Atributes 

 of God, Sed. 3. where he endeavours to refute Toland's pofi- 

 tion, that Motion is efTential to all Matter ; or, in other words, 

 that matter can move itfelf. His refutation is by the following 

 dilemma : ' If Motion, or a tendency to Motion, (which is the 

 ' fame thing in this argument), be efTential to Matter, it muft: 



* have a tendency to move fom.e one determinate way at once, or to 



* move every way at once. Now, that it cannot have the laft ten- 

 ' dency is evident.' But how does he prove that it has not the firft ? 

 *■ A tendency,' fays he, ' to move fome one detei'mined way, cannot 



* be eflential to any particle of Matter, but muft: arife from fome ex- 

 ' ternal caufe, becaufe there is nothing in the pretended neceffary 

 ' nature of any particle to determine its motion, neceffarily and ef- 



* fentially, one way rather than another.' But this is plainly begging 

 the queftion ; for thofe who maintain that Motion is eifential to 

 Matter, maintain, that there is not only a tendency in the Matter to 

 move one particular way, (and indeed it is impoffible to conceive a 

 tendency to Motion, which is not in fome one direclion or another), 

 but they further fay, that different Bodies have eifential ly and ne- 

 ceffarily different tendencies to motion in different dircdions. And 

 fome of them go fo far as to allow that the Motion is intended for 

 fome end, and, confcquently, that it is guided by Intelligence which 

 is in the Matter, together with a principle of Motion, both being, as 

 they fay, effential to Matter, And, indeed, as I have ohferved, 

 they cannot be feparated. The true anfwer, therefore, to To- 

 land's argument, is what I think I have proved, that Matter cannot 

 move itfelf; and, if it cannot move itfelf, it will follow of necefi'ary. 



COUv 



