4€ ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 



Mind ; and, in another pafTagc, he fays exprefsly, that it is a fpccies 

 of life to phyfical Bodies ; which is juft what I fay it is *. 



If Mind be not material, it cannot have parts ; for that is an efTen- 

 tial quality of Matter, which cannot belong to any thing that is not 

 material. And here we may obferve the analogy I before took no- 

 tice of, betwixt geometrical abftradtions and thofe by which we come 

 to the idea of Mind; for it appears that the Mind may not be im- 

 properly defined, as Euclid has defined a point, viz. that which has 

 no parts. 



If Mind has not parts, it follows, of neceffary confequence, that it 

 cannot be moved, or moveable : For what is moved muft neceffarily 

 have its parts in different parts of Space at different times. Nor can 

 it occupy Space, or be extended ; for Space, as I have faid, only re- 

 lates to Body, not to Mind ; otherwife Mind would have figure,as well 

 as extenfion. Mind, however, may be faid, in a certain fenfe, to be 

 fomewhere ; but in what fenfc I fhall, in the fequel, more fully ex- 

 plain. Mind, having no parts, muft alfo be indivifible ; fo that, as it 

 is the moft excellent, fo it is the pureft and fimpleft of all Subftances. 



Another 



• ^*>i T({ lv(rx '.V Tn; <fuj-« trutiffTatri zritri. Lib. 8. De Naturali Aufcultatione., cap. 5. 

 in initio This kind of life Ariftotle calls Nature, under which he comprehends 

 the principle of Motion, not only in unorganized Bodies, but in Animals and Ve- 

 getables. This is evident from what he fays in Lib. 2. cap. i. in initio, De Natu- 

 rali Aufcultatione. And accordingly he is fo underftood by his Commentator Sim* 

 plicius, in his commentary upon the Second Book of the Phvfics, p. 86. where he 



fays, "O A^irTCTiAi)? (^ve-it «;aA« Kcti Ttti ^v^li s''"' To zn^i rt/fi» x.»Ttcyit»fttti>. Nature, 



therefore, in Ariftotle's Linguage, is Mind not Intelligent, operating in Body ; for, 

 if the Mind have intelligence, it does not belong to Nature ; and, therefore, in A- 

 riflotlc's philofophy, man, as well as God, is diflinguifhed from Nature. 



And here we may obferve the true diftinclion betwixt Phyfics and Metaphyfics. 

 Phyfics treat of Mind operating in Body and through Body ; whereas Metaphyfics 

 treat of Mind feparated from Body, and operating without Body. Betwixt thefe two 

 lies the Subject of what Arillotle calls the human philofophy. This fubjeft is human 

 Intellect, which is not feparated from Body, but, though joined with it, can nCi 

 »-;thout it. 



