Chap. n. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 67 



which are common to us with the Brute : And in this manner he 

 lias confounded the Brute with Man, in the very beginning of his 

 work upon the human Mind ; nor does he appear to me ever to 

 have rightly diftinguifhed tliem, or formed a jull notion of what an 

 idea was, though it be mentioned in every page of his book. Since 

 his time, ideas and fenfations have been confounded in all our phi- 

 lofophical writings ; and the ftrange language, of ideas of fenfatioUy 

 has been introduced into philofophy ; — a confufion of terms which 

 the French have avoided ; for they diflinguilh betwixt les Idees and 

 Ics Jhifations. 



Mr Hume, fol lowing the footfteps of Mr Locke, fand, indeed, I 

 cannot help faying that Mr Locke has laid the foundation, though, I 

 believe, w'ithout intending it, of all the Atheiflical philofophy that 

 has been broached fmce his time), has told us that ideas are but 

 weaker fenfations. If fo, there will be no difference betwixt Man 

 and Brute, except in favour of the Brute, who has commonly acu- 

 ter fenfations than we have. 



One confequence, which Mr Hume has dravim from this doc- 

 trine *, is, that, as our Mind can only operate by the organs of the 

 Body, it mufl perifh with the Body. And, indeed, admitting the 

 premifes, it is not eafy to deny the conclufion, or to prove philofo- 

 phically that the Mind, never ading but in conjunftion with the 

 Body, can have a feparate exiftence. And there is another confe- 

 quenec, which, perhaps, Mr Hume did not forefee, or, if he did, I 

 believe he would not have been much alarmed, that, as there mull 

 be Ideas in the Divine Mind, if Ideas be Senfations, then Matter, 

 from which they are derived, muft be at leaft coeval with the Deity ; 



I 2 and 



* In one of the valuable legacies he has left to the public, which I have feen 

 printed, but I believe it is not yet publiflied. 



