84 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 



vage nations, even fiich of them as have made fome progrefs in arts 

 and civility, have neither a notion of it, nor a name for it, any 

 more than for other general ideas, fuch as fubftance, quantity, qua- 

 lity, and tlie like. 



The fame may be faid of the Idea of Extenfion, v^diich is ftill 

 more general than that of Figure ; for Figure is F.xtenfion bounded. 

 There are, however, qualities or accidents of extended fubjeds, as 

 w(.ll as of figured, which are perceived by the Senfe, fuch as hard 

 or foft, rough or fmooth, hot or cold, light or colour, which, how- 

 ever much we may abftradt or generalize them, will never make 

 the Idea of Extenfion. What the philofopher's Idea of Extenfion 

 is, I have elfewhere explained * : And the Idea of it, among our 

 vulgar, if they could folve and explain it, would, I believe, appear 

 to be pretty much the fame ; for they would tell you, that it was 

 fomething which they felt or faw, and which had parts, without any 

 interval betwixt thefe parts ; and that is nothing elfe, in philofophi- 

 cal language, but Quantity Continuous, 



Motion is one of Mr Locke's fimple Ideas of Senfation : But here 

 he falls into the fame error as with refpeit to colour ; he has con- 

 founded the fenfations belonging to Obje£ls in Motion, with the 

 Idea of Motion. The Senfe perceives hardnefs or foftnefs, light or 

 colour, in the objed: moved ; but thefe furely do not make the 

 Idea of Motion. It perceives alfo the objedt moved to be in a cer- 

 tain place. But neither is Place the Idea of Motion ; for the Idea 

 of Place implies fomething fixed for fome time, however fhort ; 

 whereas Motion neceflarily implies a change or a progrefs from one 

 ftate to another, which it is impoflible that the Senfe can apprehend ; 

 for Senfe can only be affeded by the prefent ftate of the thing, how- 

 ever 



p. 21. 



