Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 8-7 



thing, while the fubjed of the other is nothing but accidents or 

 qualities of the thing ; and lilcewife, as to the manner of the Mind's 

 operating, when it forms Ideas, and when it has only perceptions of 

 fenfe ; in the one cafe, operating by itfelf, without the aiTiilance of 

 the Body, or its organs, in the other, with the alfiftance of the 

 Body. 



Before I have done with Ideas, I muft take particular notice 

 of one, the fubjedt of which is of the higheft dignity and excellence 

 in Nature. The fubjedt I mean is Mind, the perception of which 

 diftinguifhes Man from the Brute, more than any thing I have men- 

 tioned. This perception even Mr Locke does not confound with 

 Senfation : Nor, indeed, is it pofhble to conceive how Mind fhould 

 be perceived by any of the Senfes ; for it is allowed by all to be a 

 power invifible, whofe operations we may perceive by the Senfes, 

 but we can never, in that way, perceive itfelf. 



The way, too, in which we acquire the Idea of Mind, deferves 

 our particular attention. Mr Locke has told us it is by refle£tion ; 

 and fo far he is right: But he has not told us by what power or facul- 

 ty of our Mind we are able to reflect. This faculty is Confcioufnefs, 

 which is peculiar to the Intelledual Mind, and diftinguilhes us more 

 from the Brute than any thing I have hitherto mentioned. By other 

 facuhies of the Mind we perceive^ but, by Confcioufnefs, we per- 

 ceive that ive perceivCy or, to exprefs it in common language, we 

 reJleSi, and know what we are doing : And not only do we know 

 in this way, what we are doing, but what we have done ; for 

 Confcioufnefs goes to ihe pajl as well as to the pre/hit. Now, that 

 the Brute Mind can turn upon itfelf in this manr.er, and review its 

 own operatiouo, no man can really believe. Even we ourfelves 

 when we act not as an intellc£tual creature, but as a mere animal 

 •which we very often do, are not confcious, and are then very 



properly 



