88 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 



properly faid to ad wltliout knowing what we are doing *. In this 

 way the Brute always ads ; for, though he perceives objcds of 

 Senfe as we do, — has appetites and defires, — feels pleafure and 

 pain, — provides for himfelf, for his offspring, and often for the com- 

 munity of which he is a member, — and, indeed, does very wonderful 

 things, — he does not know that he does them, any more than the 

 purpofe for which he does them. 



This confcioufne/s of our adions, when it is accompanied with 

 approbation or difapprobation, aflumes the name of conjcience., and 

 makes the chief happinefs or mifcry of our lives. I have already 

 faid, that I think it impofTible really to believe that the Brute has 

 this faculty of Conlcioufnefs ; but I would have the Materialift. con- 

 fidcr how much more incredible it is, that mere matter fhould turn 

 upon itfelf in this manner, make itfelf its own objed, review its 

 own operations, and approve or difapprove of them. 



As, therefore, it is by Confcioufnefs that we attain to the know- 

 ledge of what is higheft and mofl: excellent in nature, I mean Mindy 

 it is evident that it muft be the higheft faculty belonging to our na- 

 ture. And it has this further excellence, that it is not only itfelf 

 the moft certain of all knowledge, in fuch things as are the objeds 

 of it, but it is the foundation of certainty in every thing elfe, and 

 particularly in reafoning ; for it is by our retrofpedive confciouf- 

 nefs of the truth of the premiflcs that we can infer any conclu- 



fion. 



As 



• Mr Locke, and the French philofophers, who tell us that we have no percep. 

 tions of any kind, not even the perceptions of Senfe, without conftioufncfs, appear 

 to me to fpcak without knowing wh.it they fay ; for the fadt is, that we have thou- 

 fands of perceptions upon which we never rcfleft or look back, and which do not 

 remain with the Mind any more than images in a lookng-glafs. See what I have 

 further faid upon this fubjecl, in the Origin and Progrcfs of Language, vol. i. p. 

 155. — So far was Mr Locke from knowing the nature of Confcioufnefs, which, 

 howej^r, is certainly the fource of his Ideas of Reflection. 



