Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 97 



the Brute poflefles ia a certain degree, from the reafoning of a 

 Man. 



As all perceptions of Mind are either Ideas or Senfations, and as 

 reafoning of every kind muft be by comparifon of perceptions, it is 

 evident that this comparifon can only be in one or other of the three 

 following ways ; for it muft either be, comparifon of Senfations 

 with Senfations, Ideas with Ideas, or, laftly, Ideas with Senfations. 

 Now, the Brute, having no Ideas, cannot compare in either of the 

 two laft ways. But it is in thefe ways only that Men reafon ; for, 

 in every propofition, as well as in every fyllogifm, there muft be at 

 leaft one general Idea. It remains, therefore, that the Brute 

 can compare only Senfations, either prefently apprehended by the 

 Senfes, or preferved in his Phantafia. It is in this latter way, as I 

 before obferved, that he knows the things that he has before feen, 

 and that he diftinguifties different Speciefes of Animals, and different 

 Individuals of the fame Species. 



There is another reafon why the Brute cannot reafon as well as 

 we do, namely, that he wants Confcioufnefs ; for no Man, as t 

 have obferved, can infer the conclufion of a fyllogifm, (and all 

 reafoning is reducible to fyllogifm), without rejle^ing upon the af- 

 fent he had given to the two firft propofitions, or, in other words, 

 without being confcious of the truth of the premiffes. Now, as a 

 Brute cannot refle£t or recognife his own operations, it follows, of 

 neceflary confequence, that he cannot fyllogife or reafon as a Man 

 does. 



What, therefore, we read in antlent books, of the Brute being 



a rational, or, as it is exprefled in Greek, a logical Animal, muft 



be underftood only of his faculty of comparing Senfations ; for A.yoj 



in Greek, as I have obferved elfewhere *, properly fpeaking, figni- 



VoL. II. N fies 



* P. 98. 113. 114. of vol. I. 



