rtJo ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 



Secondary Senfe, fupplying the abfcnce of the Firft, — and IntelletSt. 

 One of thcfe is common to us with the Brute, and the objeifl of it is 

 the Accilental and Senfible qualities of particular and individual 

 Things; but Intcllc*^^ is peculiar to Man, and its objevH: is Ideas*. 



Correfpondent to the Gnoftic Powers of every animal muft be his 

 Orciflic ; for no animal can Dcfire what he does not know ; and, as 

 all animals arc made for fome kind of adion or another, and, as 

 the motive of a<fl;ion is Defire, what he knows he muft defne. Cor- 

 refpondent, therefore, to the Gnoftic Power of the Senfe, there muft 

 be certain Defircs, which are common to Man and Brute, like the 

 Senfe from which they arife ; and, correfponding to the Intelledt, 

 there muft be Dcfircs peculiar to Man, as Intellect is. 



The Defires arifing from Senfe, and which belong to the Anirnal 

 Nature, are of various kinds ; but they may be all comprehended 

 under two general heads, Jlppetite and Anger^ in Greek, ETnSu^ia 

 and 0u/*of, according to the explanation I have given of them in the 

 Ninth Chapter of the Second Book of the Firft Volume. But all the 

 Defires, belonging to the Intelle<£lual Nature, may be reduced to one 

 head, the Defire of Knowledge ; for, as it is by Intelle£l we know, ha- 

 ving no knowledge of any thing, except by ideas, which are the objedls 

 of intelled alone, — and as every Nature muft defire what is fuitable to 

 it, it is of neceflity that the Intelledual Nature fliould defire know- 

 ledge ; for we cannot conceive IntelletSt exifting, or at leaft operating, 

 without hwunng. Whatever ufe, therefore, may be made of the 

 knowledge, whether it be only fpeculative,or practical as well as fpccu- 

 lative, the IntelleiS can defirq nothing elfe, primarily, but Knowledge; 



If it be afked. What it is that Intelled defires to know ? My an- 

 fwer is, an infinite variety of things ; but they may be all coirpre- 



hended 



• Sec the difllnftlon betwixt Senfat^'^ns and Ideas, not only in Generals, but in 

 Pjrtkular Things, luliy exp'.iiined. p. 74. ?$■ 



