104 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 



never without thought and confideration j and it often happens, 

 that what does not pleafe the Intelleil at firft, or perhaps difi)leafes 

 it, is, upon further confideration, highly rehfhed. And the reafon 

 of the difference is plain, viz. that the Pleafures of the Man are all 

 from Intelledt, and Intelled can never adl but with thought and 

 confideration. 



But what is it, that, upon thought and confideration, makes the 

 things, that I have mentioned, Pleafant to the Intelledual Nature ? 

 In order to anfwer this qucftion, we muft recolledl what was faid 

 in the preceding chapter, that the Objed, and the only Objeft of 

 Intelledl, is Knowledge : Therefore, all the Pleafures of the Intelled: 

 muft proceed from Knowledge ; and Science, Virtue, and the Fine 

 Arts, muft all pleafe, becaufe they are accompanied with Know- 

 ledge. 



But this is not a fufficient anfwer to the queftion ; for we muft further 

 fay. What there is in Knowledge that makes it Pleafing ? And, in the 

 firjl place, I fay, that even the fearch after Knowledge, and the in- 

 veftigation of the Knowledge of Things, gives us pleafure in fome 

 degree ; becaufe this inveftigation is an exercife of Intelled:, and, as I 

 faid, Nature has annexed Pleafure to the exercife of every faculty. 



But what is it, that makes us delight in Knowledge when it is 

 found ? To this queftion I think it is not a fufficient anfwer, though 

 it be commonly made, that Knowledge pleafes for its own fake ; 

 for there muft be fomething in the Objedl known, which, upon re- 

 flexion, pleafes Mind. And I fay that is Beauty ; for Truth, and 

 Science, and Virtue, pleafe us, becaufe they are Beautiful ; and every 

 body will readily admit, that we delight in the Fine Arts for that 

 reafon. 



I 



