io6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 



wrote upon the fubjea by itfelf, had been preferved, we fliould have 

 probably found there a complete Philofophical Definition of it. 

 Plato, though he fpeaks of the to x«A9», or the Beautiful, almoft in 

 every page, has no where given a definition of it. A great deal, 

 indeed, has been written upon the fubjecl in modern times, both in 

 French and Englifti ; but, as the authors were not learned in An- 

 tient Philofophy, though they have faid lively and agreeable things, 

 they do not fatisfy me. It is, therefore, in the principles of the 

 Antient Phllofophy, that we are to feek for the folution of this que- 

 ftion. 



And, in xhefrji place, it is evident, that the perception of Beau- 

 ty is not a perception of Senfe. The Mind, no doubt, perceives 

 Beauty in the obje£l:s of Senfe : But that perception is quite diffe- 

 rent from the perception of the objedls ; and, accordingly, the Brutes 

 perceive the objects as well as wc, but have no perception of 

 Beauty. 



2dOy There Is no Beauty in one fingle thing, confidered by itfelf 

 and abftrafted from every thing elfe. — To this it may be obje£ted, 

 that we perceive Beauty in a fingle Animal or Vegetable. But I 

 anfwer, that it is the parts of that Animal or Vegetable compared 

 together, and the harmony and proportion which we difcover in 

 thefe parts, that gives us the idea of Beauty. 



3/io, This obfervation brings us near to the true notion of Beau- 

 ty ; for it fhows us, that it muft confift in Relation, which cannot 

 be of a fingle thing to itfelf, but of two or more things to one an- 

 other. 



And here we may obferve the connection betwixt Truth and Beau- 

 ty ; for Truth cannot be of a fingle thing, any more than Beauty. 



So 



