Chap. V. ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. 107 



So far, therefore, we are advanced In our inquiry, as to have dif- 

 covered to which of the categories Beauty belongs, viz. to Relation; 

 for every philofopher, that has been taught in the fchoo! of antiqui- 

 ty, will endeavour to arrange under fome one of the categories e- 

 very thing, the nature of which he inveftigates. By this means he 

 knows the mofi: general properties of the thing; and from thence he 

 will endeavour to deduce the more particular, till he come at laft to 

 a complete definition of the thing in queftion : As in this cafe, there 

 being many different Relations of things, he muft inquire, What Re- 

 lation it is that makes what we call Beauty ? And I fay it is that Re- 

 lation of things which forms a Syftem ; fo that wherever the Mind 

 perceives a Syftem in things, it has the Idea of Beauty. 



But, what is a Syftem ? It is the Relation of two or more things, 

 fo conneiSted together, as to be one whole, which when the Mind 

 perceives, it has the Idea of a Syftem, and confequently of Beauty. 



And here again we may perceive a further connexion betwixt 

 Truth and Beauty ; for they are, each of them, the perception of the 

 one in the many : And, from hence we may fee, that our definition 

 of Beauty is fo far a true definition, that it applies to Truth and Sci- 

 ence, one of the three things, which, I faid, gave pleafure to the In- 

 telledt ; for no body will deny, that Truth and Science are Beauti- 

 ful. 



But, is it true what Plato fays, that, in every Idea, the Mind per- 

 ceives the One in the Many ? And it is undoubtedly true ; for we 

 cannot have an Idea of any one individual thing, and much lefs of 

 a Species, or a Genus, without perceiving the one in the majty. For, 

 even in an individual thing, unlefs we perceive what is chief or 

 principal in it, and upon which all its other qualities are dependent, 

 we have not an Idea of it j and when we form an Idea of a Species 



O2 or 



