io8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 



or Genus, It is plain that we make one, of feveral individuals, as in 

 the other cafe, we make one, of the feveral qualities of the fame indivi- 

 dual *. Every Idea, therefore, is a Syftem by itfelf ; and, according to 

 my definition of Beauty, is Beautiful : And, if a fingle Idea be Beau- 

 tiful, becaufe it is a Syftem, the moft fimple propofition, which only 

 joins two Ideas together, muft be beautiful likewife, becaufe it pre- 

 fents to us two Ideas, making a Syftem ; for all affirmative propofi- 

 tions aver, that the predicate is either the genus or accident of the 

 fubje<a:t= And, as to negative propofitions, though they have no 

 Beauty or Syftem in themfelves, they may tend to fhew, that there 

 is Beauty or Syftem in fome other things. And this we may ob- 

 ferve, in paffing, makes it evident, that Knowledge is not in itfelf, 

 and merely becaufe it is Knowledge, Beautiful : For we know a 

 negative propofition as certainly as we do an affirmative ; and vet 

 it is not in itfelf, nor for its own fake, Beautiful. 



And here again we may obferve the goodnefs of Providence, 

 which hath annexed Pleafure to every the leaft operation of Intel- 

 led ; for, as Intelledt perceives nothing but Ideas, it muft perceive 

 every thing in Syftem, and by confequence enjoy the Pleafure of 

 Beauty in every perception. 



But it is to be obferved, at the fame time, that, though there be 

 Beauty in the fmalleft Syftem, fuch as that of a fingle Idea or fim- 

 ple Propofition, the Beauty is greater or lefs as the Syftem is great- 

 er or lefs. Therefore, the Beauty of a fingle Idea is not fo great as 

 of a Species, nor of a Species as of a Genus above it : And, for the 

 fame reafon, the Beauty of a higher Genus is greater than that of 



a 



* See this explained at fome length, p. 

 t Vol, I. p. 383- 



