114 ANTIENT M ET A T II YS I C S. Book II. 



reafon can be afllgncd for fuch a difference betVvixt judgment 

 and conduft, then we muft admit, that, if our motive to any ac- 

 tion be no other than to acquire eftate, title, or public applaufe, the 

 adtion is not virtuous : Or, if it proceed from the moft difmterefted 

 Benevolence, yet, if it has not that fitnefs and propriety, vphich alone 

 can make it beautiful, it is not a virtuous adion ; for I can conceive 

 adlons perfedly difmterefted, proceeding from natural afFedion, 

 from a certain inftindive Love which we may have for the perfons 

 that we are accuftomed to live with, or from a general good-will 

 to our kind, which are not virtuous, bccaufe they are not perform- 

 ed with that confideration and refiedion which Virtue requires, but 

 from a kind of inftindive impulfe, fuch as makes Brutes perform 

 the fame adions : For the Brutes are as fond of their offspring as we 

 are ; they have a love for their kind, which makes them herd with 

 animals of their own fpecies, rather than with any other ; and they 

 have private friendfhips, too, which they contrad from living toge- 

 ther. Such adions, therefore, belong to the Animal, not to the In- 

 telledual Nature. And I fay the fame of an adion proceeding from 

 the Paffion of Pity, by which we are affeded, fometimcs to a very 

 great degree, by the fufFerings of our fellow creatures, and in a lefler 

 degree, by the fufferings of any of the animal race. But no Virtue is 

 Paffion : And Pity is Paffion arifing from a natural inftindive affedion, 

 by which we are conneded with our kind, and, in fome degree, with 

 the whole animal race ; and accordingly it operates inftantly, with- 

 out any reflex ad of the judgment approving of it. And we fee 

 fomething like it among the Brutes, for they appear dlfturbed when 

 any of their fpecies exprefs pain by their cries. — In ll\ort, I hold that 

 no adion can be virtuous, unlcfs the Mind confider of it before it is 

 done, and approve of it, as becoming, handfome, and beautiful. 

 There muft, therefore, be a choice in all fuch adions, and a prefe- 

 rence given to them, which, by Ariftotle and the other Greek phi- 

 lofophers, is called Tcoa'^za-a, and is held by them to be efTential to 

 Virtue : So that, whatever is done without choice and deliberation, 

 tl\ough proceeding from the kitideft and beft affedions, belongs not 



to 



