Chap. VI. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. » 15 



to the IntelleiStual Nature, but to the Animal ; and therefore it is not 

 Virtue. To make Virtue of any Affedion, there muft be an appre- 

 henfion of Merit and Well-dcferving in the Obje£t of the AfFeftion. 

 In Pity, for example, if we know nothing of the perfon, whether 

 he be well or ill-deferving, it is no more, as I have faid, than a mere 

 animal feeling ; and it is only the apprehenfion of fome worth in 

 the perfon that makes it a virtuous feeling : For proof of which, let 

 us fuppofe that w^e know the perfon to be worthlefs, we have no 

 longer that feeling for him which deferves the name of Pity, if we 

 fuppofe Pity to be an Affedion of the Rational Nature ; and, though 

 the fight of him in pain may be ofFenfive to our Animal Nature, yet 

 our reafon, fo far from being diflatisfied with his fufFerings, which it 

 would be, if he were really an objed: of Pity, will rather approve 

 of them, and even rejoice in them, if he be a great criminal : — Or, 

 though he fhould not be a criminal, but of a mean contemptible 

 character, we will rather defpife him than pity his misfortunes. Of this 

 Plutarch has given us a fine example, in his Life of Paulus Emilius, 

 the conqueror of Macedon. He tells us that, when Perfeus, the laft 

 King of that country, was brought a prifoner into the prefence of 

 Paulus, he behaved with fuch abjedl fubmiffion, even proftrating 

 himfelf before him, that, Plutarch fays, he deprived himfelf of the laft 

 confolation of the unfortunate, that of being pitied. 



Thus, I think I have Ihown, that Ariftotle is in the right when he 

 makes the re k«Xoi/, or the Beautiful, the foundation of all Virtue, 

 and an effential part of the definition of every particular Virtue. 



If it were neceflary to fay more upon this fubjed, I would fup- 

 pofe a man doing the beft adions, and from motives the moft difin- 

 terefted, fuch as Benevolence, and Love to his Country and Man- 

 kind, and yeti at the fame time, without the leaft Senfe that he was 

 ading a becoming and handfome part, and without any pleafure in 

 what he did : I would defire to know whether fuch a man could be 

 cfteemed virtuous ? I think it is impoflible he could ; for Virtue can- 



P 2 not 



