Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 135 



tafia, we do not a£t as a Man, or Intelledual Creature, but as a 

 mere Animal. 



The Defires and the Pleafures hkewife of the Intellectual Nature 

 are quite different from thofe of the Senfitive. It is true, indeed, 

 that Intellect operates upon Matter ; and that our Intelled: ufes the 

 Materials which the fenfe furnifhes. But it is of neceflity that In- 

 telledl fhould operate upon Matter, either mediately or immediately, 

 otherwife the Material World could not be fuch as it is : And we 

 fhould not be men, if our Intellect could operate without the Mate- 

 rials furnifhed by Senfe. 



2^0, Nobody will fay, that the Animal and Vegetable Natures are 

 not diftiiKH:, though joined together in the fame compofition ; and, 

 Why fhould not the Intellectual Nature be as diftindt from the Ani- 

 mal, as this is from the Vegetable ? It is faid, that Intellect is no- 

 thing but an improvement of the Animal Nature : Why may it not 

 be as well faid, that the Animal is no more than an improvement 

 upon the Vegetable ? If it had pleafed God to join the Intelle<^ual 

 Nature to the Vegetable, without interpofmg the Animal, Would it 

 not have been ridiculous to have faid, that the Intellectual Nature 

 was nothing but a finer kind of Vegetable ? Whatever is faid to be 

 a Refinement or Improvement of another thing, mufl be of the fame 

 kind. Thus, if the fenfes of any Animal be made more acute, — if 

 the Phantafia be made to reprefent the obje(5ts in it more perfeiftly, 

 and to retain them longer, — if an InflinCt fhall be given him, direc^ 

 ting him better to prefervethe individual, and continue the kind, — the 

 Animal, no doubt, will be improved : But, if Powers and Faculties 

 are given him of a quite different kind, and ferving purpofes quite 

 different; then the Nature of the Animal will not be improved, but 

 another Nature of a different kind will be added to his. 



