154 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 



unlefs we will maintain, with the C;irtcrians, that Matter and 

 Extenfion are the fame. — This philolbphy is much more antient 

 than the philofophy of Plato and Ariftotle, and, I am perfuaded, is 

 as antient as any in the world : For it was the philofophy of the 

 School of Pythagoras ; and, I think, there is no reafon to doubt that it 

 was brought by him from Egypt. It is to be found in that moft va- 

 luable piece of Pythagorean philofophy, Timaeus de Anima Mundiy 

 who fays that the Material World confifts of three things, the Idea, 

 that is, the Form, — the Matter, — and the compofite of thefe two, that 

 is, the things which are perceived by our Senfes *. As to Subftan- 

 ces immaterial ; it is almoft needlefs to obferve, that they could ad- 

 mit of no fuch compofition ; they were all Form, and therefore the 

 moft fimple of all Beings. 



The laft diftindtion I fhall mention is well known, even to thofe 

 who are no farther advanced than to the threfhold of philofophy ; it ia 

 betwixt Subftance and Accident, — a diftindlion which runs through 

 the whole of things, every thing exifting being either Subftance 

 or Accident. It is fo obvious, and has been fo often taken 

 notice of before, that I fhould not have mentioned it upon this oc- 



cafion. 



•See what I hav€ Lid before in a note upon p. 70. of the different ways in which 

 Plato and Ariftotle exprefs themfelves, concerning the Form, or Idea, of a Thing, 

 and that Idea joined with Matter, fo as to make a Compofite, which is apprehended 

 by the Senfes. — Without entering into the controverfy betwixt Plato and his 

 fcholar about Ideas, I think it muft be admitted, that the Matter of which any na- 

 tural fubftance is compofed, is in conftant change, and never one moment the fame: 

 It is, therefore, the Idea of fuch fubftances alone that has a permanent ex* 

 iflence ; and, accordingly, it is only by the Idea that any thing is an objedi: of 

 Intelleft. And it is in this way that Ariftotle himfelf argues againfl. Heraclitus, 

 and others, who faid. That nothing had any permanent exiftcnce, but every thing 

 was in a perpetual flux like the ftream of a river; Metaph- lib. 4. cap. 5. — p. 878. 

 edit. Du Val. 



