i66 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 



But, whether Ariftotic believed that we had two Intelledbs, or 

 only one, it is perfedly clear that he believed that at leafl we had 

 one Intelledt that was incorruptible and immortal. And, indeed, it 

 appears to me, that no pliilofopher or divine ever thought more 

 hi"-hlv of the Human Soul than Ariftotle. Even when he confiders 

 "it as adling in conjunction with the Body, he fays it is x^f'V) that 

 \s,jeparable ; but, when it is adually feparated, (for that is the force 

 of the word x"f"&«0> '^^^^^ ^'^'X ^^ '''» what it truly is, immortal 

 and eternal *. 



But, farther, he fays that, in this feparate ftate, it is, by 

 its eflence, active ; fo that it cannot exift without ading or energi- 

 fing, T« ouT»« m t)ii^yii*-\ : And, a little farther down, in the fame 



chapter, 



• Xwfi^sc, ^i srTi juomv T«w«' iit'n Irli" kki Tot/To fimf mtxticTty k«i «iJie». De Anima, Lib 3. 



cap. 6. The diflin£liori betwixt mUtxrat and xiiitf I have obferved elfewhere, (vol. 

 I. p. 140.) When he fays, that the Intellect only is immortal and eternal, he 

 means, as Philoponus has well explained the paflage, that the other parts of our 

 compofition, fuch as the Senfitive and the Vegetative, are mortal ; for, it appears 

 from other paffages in this work, particularly lib. i. cap. 3. in fine, that Ariftotic 

 did not believe in the Pythagorean dodtrine of Tranfmigration. 



If the Intelleft alone be immortal and eternal, and the other parts of our compo- 

 fition not eternal, it is evident, that, according to the opinion of Ariftotle, it muft 

 be a fubftance by itfelf, and not a quality, improvement, or refinement of the Sen- 

 fitive or Vegetative parts of our Nature; and, accordingly, Ariftotle, lib. \.De 

 Jnima, cap. 5. has exprefsly faid, that the Intelieft is a fubftance by itfelf, which 

 is not corrupted or impaired by the decay of our Senfitive Faculties : 'O h »»v( t„- 



xlf tyyinrBcii, ivrim T»» ovrit, k*i ov fiiiifirB*f fttc\iTr» yu^ «^<i({iT mt vac fttt «» tm yn^a 



»na.-j^uirtv!, &c. where it is to be obferved, that the word iyyi»«f5«» implies, that the 

 Soul is added, or, as it were, infertcd, into the corporeal part, being a fubftance 

 quite diftinft from it. And, in the ift chap, of the 2d book, and indeed every 

 where through the whole work, he fpeaks of Mind, in general, as being a fubftance 

 by itfelf. 



\ Lib. 3. cap. 6. 



