I yd 



ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 



Book IV.. 



us he ufc3 the word *,) are either Ideas of Senfation, or Reflcdion, 

 ia the fenlc wliich I have given to thefe terms. 



If this dodlrine he true, we have no Idea that is not made out of 

 perceptions of Senfc, or perceptions of the operations of our own 

 Minds. Senllition, therefore, and Refledion, are, according to Mr 

 Locke, the only Sources of our Ideas : Or, to fpeak more properly, 

 there is hut one fource of them, viz. Senfation, as the Mind, at 

 \n-(\, onlv operates upon tlie ohjcds of Senfe ; fo that, even our 

 Ideas of Refiedion are to be derived from Senfe. And, further, 

 as Senfe is excited by external objeds, thefe objeds are ul- 

 timately the fource and origin of all our Ideas ; fo that all we 

 know and undcrftand, all thofe eternal truths which philofophers 

 talk fo much of, have no better origin than thofe tranfitory, material 

 objeds, which are running a conftant round of generation and cor- 

 ruption. 



Mr Locke does not appear to have believed, that the Human Mind 

 had any Ideas, or, indeed, any cxiftence, before its appearance oa 

 this ftage : And, if fo, our Intelligence, which cannot be concei- 

 ved without Ideas, mufl: be derived entirely from Matter. A philo- 

 fophy., which debafes the Human Mind fo much, ought to be care- 

 fully examined : And, if the reader is not violently prejudiced in 

 favour of this material origin of our Intelledual Part, I hope to be 

 able to convince him, tbat, however much fomc of our Ideas may 

 be conneded with Matter, we have others, and thofe too of the 

 greateft importance, which have no connedlon with Matter, and 

 cannot be derived from any reflex ad of the Mind upon its own o- 

 perations, but are immediately and diredly from thofe ftores, 

 which, I fay, arc originally in the Mind itfclf. 



Ill 



• Introdud'on, k€t. 8. 



