Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 177 



In the fvjl place, Neither Mr Locke, nor any body that believes 

 iu God, will fay, that all the Ideas of every Mind, and particularly 

 of the Divine Mind, are from Matter; or, that the Ideas, or 

 Forms, which we find incorporated with Matter in the Material 

 World, are not derived from thofc Ideas in the Divine Mind which 

 make what we call the Intelle£lual World, of which the Material 

 is no more than a type, or fhadow, that is continually pafTing away. 

 If then it be true, that we are made after the image of God, is it 

 not natural to fuppofe, that we have in our Minds fome, at leaft, 

 of thofe original Forms underived from Matter, which, though they 

 may be latent fome time, are, at laft, roufed and excited, Jirjl, by 

 Impulfe from external obje£ls Upon our organs of Senfe, and then 

 by that adive power which is eflential to the Intellectual Mind. 



But the matter does not reft upon this probability ; for, I will 

 give many examples of Ideas, and thefe too of the greateft impor- 

 tance, which can have no other origin : And I will fhow, that Mr 

 Locke's fyftem, which derives all Ideas, or Appearances, in the hu- 

 man Mind, from Senfation and Refledtion, however plaufible the 

 novelty of it may have made it appear at firft, is, when thoroughly 

 examined, exceedingly defedive and altogether erroneous. 



The firft example I give of an Idea that is original and Indige- 

 nous in the Mind, and not derived either from Matter, or from the 

 operations of our Mind upon Matter, is an Idea which ftands at the 

 head of the categories : The Idea I mean is Suhjlance, which be- 

 longs to the Unlverfity of things, as all things in the univcrfe are 

 either Subftance or Accident. Now, this Idea is certainly not a per- 

 ception of Senfe, as I have fhown elliewhere * ; and, accordingly, 

 the Brute has it not : Nor is it a Perception of any operation of our 

 Vol. II. Z own 



• P- 73. 



